As the global order undergoes rapid realignment, India is preparing to assume the chairmanship of BRICS next year, stepping into a leadership role at a moment marked by geopolitical friction, competing national priorities, and growing scrutiny from Western powers—particularly the United States. The task before New Delhi is complex: guide an expanded and increasingly influential bloc while keeping it cohesive, credible, and relevant to the developing world.
BRICS, originally formed by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, with South Africa joining shortly thereafter, has evolved far beyond its early conception as a loose association of emerging economies. With the recent inclusion of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia, the grouping now represents nearly half of the world’s population and close to 40 per cent of global economic output. This rapid expansion has amplified both its influence and the challenges of managing internal diversity.
India has made it clear that its presidency will place the Global South at the centre of the BRICS agenda. Officials see the chairmanship as an opportunity to reinforce the bloc’s relevance to developing nations while demonstrating that multilateral cooperation can still deliver tangible outcomes despite diverging national interests. “India wants to show that BRICS can work for countries facing common challenges, even when their political or strategic priorities differ,” a senior analyst noted.
Reimagining BRICS Beyond Western Structures
A central theme of India’s approach is the idea of reducing dependence on Western-dominated institutions. During a BRICS meeting in July, Prime Minister Narendra Modi proposed reinterpreting the acronym as “Building Resilience and Innovation for Cooperation and Sustainability,” signaling a push toward a more development-focused identity.
High on India’s agenda is the creation of a proposed investment guarantee mechanism aimed at addressing climate change, poverty reduction, energy transition, and infrastructure financing. The idea is to develop financial tools controlled by BRICS nations themselves, operating alongside the New Development Bank rather than relying on Western-led institutions.
“Countries, especially the smaller countries of the Global South, don’t have to go and fill in complicated forms in Washington,” said former Indian diplomat Rajiv Dogra. “They can do it in an approachable way. One of the ideas is to have an institution, in addition to the New Development Bank, that takes care of guarantees of this nature.”
India also plans to replicate elements of its widely praised 2023 G20 presidency by decentralising BRICS engagements. By hosting meetings across dozens of Indian cities, New Delhi hopes to internationalise lesser-known destinations while familiarising its own citizens with the country’s expanding global role.
Walking a Diplomatic Tightrope
Yet the most delicate challenge of India’s BRICS presidency lies in managing internal contradictions while navigating pressure from Washington. New Delhi will need to position the bloc as firmly pro–Global South without allowing it to be perceived as overtly anti-Western—a balance that becomes increasingly difficult as BRICS’ ambitions grow.
Relations within the bloc itself add another layer of complexity. India’s ties with China have shown signs of cautious thawing since 2024, but strategic distrust remains, particularly over Beijing’s close relationship with Pakistan—an issue New Delhi views through the lens of national security.
“I think it is an open secret that China’s support for Pakistani policies does create complications,” said Rajiv Bhatia, distinguished fellow at Gateway House. “But within BRICS, when it comes to developing common positions, China essentially cooperates with the other members.”
External pressures are no less significant. The return of tariff threats from US President Donald Trump, including warnings of 100 per cent duties if BRICS attempts to undermine the US dollar’s dominance, complicates India’s diplomatic calculus. This comes at a time when New Delhi is simultaneously seeking a trade deal with Washington and lobbying for tariff concessions.
“The US administration and foreign office are not vocal in either criticism or appreciation,” Dogra observed. “But they acknowledge that BRICS means no harm to America. As far as Trump is concerned, he’s not going to change his views. So we have to live with that.”
A Test of Global Leadership
If India succeeds in steering BRICS through these crosscurrents, its presidency could reshape how the Global South exercises influence in an increasingly fragmented world. The coming year will test not only India’s diplomatic agility, but also the very idea of whether a diverse coalition like BRICS can move beyond symbolism to deliver meaningful cooperation.
As New Delhi prepares to take the helm, expectations are high—and so are the stakes. India’s ability to balance ambition with pragmatism may well determine whether BRICS emerges as a coherent force or remains an alliance defined by its contradictions.
